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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
OGDEN CITY, a :Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FERRELL H. ADA:JIS, State Treasurer of 
Utah, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During the period of March 31, 1951 to August 
27, 1951, five criminal actions, each with more than one 
defendant, for violation of Section 46-0-237, U.C.A., 1943, 
were prosecuted in Weber County, State of Utah. All 
the evidence for said prosecutions was obtained by 
private investigators who were employed by and paid 
by Ogden City and by officers of Ogden City. At the 
same time these criminal prosecutions were commenced 
five civil proceedings to forfeit the personal property 
used in connection with liquor nuisances were com-
menced on Relation of Paul Thatcher, City Attorney 
of Ogden City. All said criminal and civil actions were 
successfully prosecuted. Substantial sums resulted in 
fines and forfeitures in the criminal cases. 
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2. All the fines and forfeitures in the criminal cases 
have been sent to the defendant herein and he now has 
the same in his possession and control. 
3. The plaintiff pursuant to Section 46-0-219 ob-
tained certificates from the judges who presided at the 
hearings on each of the criminal cases certifying that 
officers of Ogden City initiated the prosecution of each 
case; the evidence was obtained by and at the expense 
of Ogden City, and officers of Ogden City assisted in 
the successful prosecution of each of said cases and 
that all fines, forfeitures or costs paid to the defendant 
as a result of said prosecutions should be paid to Ogden 
City. The judges further certified that all fines, for-
feitures and costs received by the defendant in said cases 
he paid to Ogden City. 
4. The chairman of the Utah State Liquor Commis-
sion in writing approved the payment of all said fines, 
forfeitures and costs to Ogden City. 
5. The judges of the court in which said criminal 
cases were beard before issuing the certificates men-
tioned in Paragraph 3 above had copies of the petition of 
the plaintiff for issuance of said certificates served on 
the District Attorney of the Second Judicial District and 
on the Weber County Attorney and a date was set for 
bearing on said petitions. No objection was made by 
anyone to the issuance of said certificates. 
6. In addition to obtaining all the evidence and in-
itiating all of the cases, two of the attorneys for Ogden 
City helped the County Attorney prepare the criminal 
complaints and appeared as attorneys of record in and 
were personally present at all of the hearings before 
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the mag·istrate. All of the defendants in three of the 
cases waived preliminary hearings. The defendants in 
two of the cases demanded and had preliminary hear-
ings. At both said preliminary hearings two attorneys 
of Ogden City actiYely participated with the County 
Attorney, they questioned witnesses, looked up the law 
and did all other things that attorneys prosecuting 
criminal cases do. All of the defendants were bound 
over to the District Court. 
7. In the District Court, the District Attorney 
prepared the information in all the cases. Two of the 
attorneys for Ogden City appeared in each of the cases 
in the District Court. Plaintiff's officers were present 
and participated in nearly all the consultations with 
the defendants and their counsel regarding disposition 
of the cases. The District Court work in these cases 
consisted only of arraignments, pleas and consulta-
tions. Each defendant plead guilty. There were no 
trials and no preparation for trials in the District 
Court. The real work of the cases was in o htaining 
the evidence, preparing the complaints handling the 
preliminary hearings and consulting with the defend-
ants regarding disposition of the cases. 
8. Demand has been made by plaintiff on the de-
fendant for the remittance to it of all fines and forefeit-
ures he has received from these five cases and the de-
fendant refuses to make said remittance and as a result 
thereof this action was brought, praying for an extra-
ordinary writ to compel remittance to plaintiff of the 
fines in question. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Under the express words of Section 46-0-219, 
U.C.A. 1943, plaintiff is entitled to be paid the fines in 
defendant's hands. 
2. Opinions of the Attorney General are not con-
trolling. 
3. There has been no acquiescence by the plaintiff 
in the administrative interpretation. 
POINT 1. UNDER THE EXPREISS WORDS OF 
SECTION 46-0-219, U.C.A. 1943, PLAINTIFF IS EN-
TITLED TO BE PAID THE FINES IN DEFEND-
ANT'S HANDS. 
Said section reads as follows: 
'' 46-0-219. Payment Over of Fines and For-
feitures. All fines and forfeitures levied under 
this act shall be paid to the state treasurer and 
credited to the general fund; PROVIDED, HOW-
EVER, that in all cases where violations of this 
act are prosecuted to a conviction by the officer 
of any town, city or county the judge of the court 
wherein such prosecution took place shall certify 
to the state treasurer that such prosecution was 
conductad by the officers of such town, city or 
county, and the state treasurer, on the written 
approval of the chairman of the commission, 
shall pay to said town, city or county all amounts 
collected as fines, forfeitures or costs as the 
result of such prosecution.'' 
The words of statutes should be given their ordinary 
and usual meaning. If that is done to this section, there 
is no ambiguity or uncertainty except as to the meaning 
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of "prosecuted to eonYirtion. '' In unequivienl terms 
the legislature has provided that upon propt'r rPrtificate 
and consent al! fines and forfeitun's levied under the 
Liquor Control Aet should be returned to the town, city 
or county in those rases where officers of such town, 
city of county prosecute the cases. 
Xo distinction is made as to the court in which the 
prosecution takes place-the plain meaning must he 
that the legislature meant the statute to apply to all 
courts of the state, not merely as the defendant con-
tends to city and justice of the peace courts. 
The statute says "All fines and forfeitures levied 
under this act'' the plain meaning must be the provisions 
apply to all fines and forfeitures where levied, whether 
for simple misdemeanors or indictable misdemeanors. 
The defendant agrees that the statute means what it 
says and applies to fines from all courts when it provides 
that" all" fines shall be paid over to him. However, he 
refuses to agree that it means what it says when it 
provides that "all" fines growing out of local prose-
cutions (without restriction as to the court of origin) 
shall be repaid to the local unit. In the latter case he 
insists, at least by implication, that ''all'' means only 
"part"-that part originating in the lower courts. And 
nowhere in the opinions of the Attorney General, which 
are hereafter considered, is any attempt made to justify 
this inconsistency in the meaning attributed to the same 
simple word. It would seem that "all" for the goose 
should mean ''all' for the gander. 
What was the purpose of Section 46-0-219 ~ It is 
common knowledge that the enforcement of any liquor 
control act is a very difficult matter. The legislature 
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in that act sought to enlist and require the active assist-
ance of all officers in this state be they state, county, 
city or town officers. Section 46-0-248 makes it the 
duty of "all city, county, precinct and state executive, 
prosecuting and peace officers'' to enforce the pro-
visions of the act and provides for other attorneys to 
assist the prosecuting attorney and be counsel in the 
case. Section 46-0-206 requires any district, county, 
city or town attorney or peace officer or any other person 
to come forward with any information they have of 
violation of the act. 
It is apparent that the legislature recognized the 
difficulties of enforcement. Sections 46-0-248 and 46-
0-206 make enforcement a duty of local unit. Section 
46-0-219 makes it financially worthwhile. Section 46-0-
219 is merely another means the legislature used to en-
courage the active assistance of all officers in the state 
to help enforce the act. It provides that in those cases 
where local officers prosecute, the returns if any from 
those prosecutions will go to the local governmental unit. 
Thus the expenses of the local governmental unit in 
prosecuting liquor control act violators will be in part 
or in whole paid and in some cases may be financially 
profitable. Thus the enforcement of the act will be a 
lesser or no burden on the local units and they will 
naturally be more enthusiastic about expending their 
money and the time and efforts of their officers in liquor 
control activities. 
The encouragement of local enforcement has become 
even more important in the overall administration of 
the Liquor Control Act since the abolition of the Liquor 
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Commission's enforcement unit. Now, unless local offi-
cers are encouraged, enforcement will be routine and 
perfunctory In most localities, and the purpose of the 
law will be defeated. 
The legislature makes the controlling factors in the 
matter of remittance of the fines and forfeitures (1) 
prosecution to a conviction: by the officers of a town, 
city or county; (2) certification of that fact to the state 
treasurer by the judge of the court wherein such prose-
cution took place; (3) written approval by chairmen 
of the Liquor CommiS<sion of the remittance to the town, 
city or county of said fines and forfeitures. There arle' 
no other factors or conditions attached by the legislature. 
The restriction as to court of origin is a contribution 
from attorney general's opinions with no basis what-
ever in this or any other statute. 
In his answer the defendant admits that conditions 
2 and 3 have been compiled with but denies that condition 
1 has been met. Did officers of Ogden City prosecute 
to conviction in the five criminal ca·ses here involved 
within the meaning of Section 46-0-219 ~ 
In the ordinary indictable misdemeanor case a per-
son with knowledge of "t~e facts presents them to the 
county attorney. The county attorney issues a complaint 
and handles proceedings before the magistrate to have 
the defendant bound over to the district court. The 
district attorney prepares the Information and handles 
the matter in the district court. 
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In the ordinary simple misdemeanor case under a 
state statute a person with knowledge of the facts pre-
sents them to the county attorney and the county at-
torney tries the case. 
It must be assumed that the legislature was aware 
of the method for handling these matters when it en-
acted the Liquor Control Act. Undoubtedly the legis-
lature did not intend to upset this orderly procedure 
and it intended that offenses under that act should be 
handled the same way as far as possible. By Sections 
46-0-206, 46-0-219, 46-0-248 and other provisions the 
legislature made it the duty of all officers to assist 
in enforcement and provided for other attorneys to 
assist the county and district attorneys. 
If the legislature intended that ''prosecute to con-
viction'' in Section 46-0-219 meant that the officers of 
a city or town had to issue the complaint and exclusi-
vely and without the aid or cooperation of the County 
or District Attorney handle the case before the mag-
istrate and in the district court, then as a practical 
matter and as a legal proposition Section 46-0-219 is 
a nullity a.s far as city and towns are concerned. The 
orderly administration of justice requires that so long 
as county and district attorneys are competent, honest 
and actively carrying out the duties of their office 
that all state complaints be issued by and with the co-
operation of the county attorney and all district court 
criminal matters be under the supervision and con-
trol of the district attorney. So if the legislature 
meant ''prosecute to conviction'' to mean exclusive 
initiation, control and trial by town or city officers, 
as a practical matter, the ·statute 46-0-219 was a use-
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less enactment because city and town officers cannot, 
will not and should not undertake such proceedings 
on their own. The legislature must have intended "pro-
secute to conviction'' to mean to do those acts necessary 
to convict and to do them within the orderly established 
channels for the administration of justice, that is pre-
sent the evidence to the County Attorney and have 
complaints issued; obtain the evidence; assist the County 
Attorney at the arraignment and preliminary hearing 
before the magistrate and conduct said hearing if the 
county attorney desires; to conduct the trial in the 
district court or assist the district attorney herein. 
Officers of Ogden City did everything in each of the five 
cases here involved that could be done without ignoring 
the orderly channels for the administration of justice 
and without totally disregarding the county and the 
district attorneys. If it had not been for action taken by 
the officers of Ogden City, there would not have been 
any cases and there would not have been any convict- · 
ions and no fines or forfeitures would have been real-
ized. 
It is to be observed in this connection that the leg-
isltature, in providing for repayment of the fines, refer-
red to the ''officers'' of the local governmental unit. 
It did not refer to "prosecuting attorneys", although 
attorneys are specifically mentioned in other sections. 
It would seem clear from this choice of words that the 
legislature intended a broad interpretation of the word 
"prosecuted", because in the narrow sense of that 
word, a prosecution can be conducted before a court 
only by an attorney. 
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It is equally clear, we submit, that where local 
officers ''made'' the case, and a conviction resulted, 
the legislature intended those officers' local units to 
have the benefit of the fines. Any other interpreta-
tion defeats the obvious purpose of the law and ren-
ders many of its provisions meaningless. The legisla-
ture wanted liquor ''control'' for the state -- not fines 
' 
which were clearly regarded as a means to that end. 
See Section 46-0-44, U. S. C., 1943. 
The legislature provided in 46-0-219 that the judge 
of the court in which the case was held should certify 
who or what officers prosecuted the case. In each of 
the five cases here involved, judges presiding, the 
county attorney and the district attorney recognized 
that Ogden City officers were responsible for all said 
prosecutions. No objection of any kind was made to 
the issuance of ,said certificates and the judges who 
knew the whole circumstances made the certificates. 
The plaintiff submit that the actions of its officers 
in each of the five cases here involved constitute "pro-
secuted to conviction'' as those words are used in Sec-
tion 46-0-219; that the section applies to all fines and 
forfeitures levied under the Liquor Control Act, regard-
less of the court in which levied; and that there is a 
clear and present statutory duty resting on the trea-
surer to remit the fines to the plaintiff. 
POINT 2. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY 
GEINERAL ARE NOT CONTROLLING. 
10 
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The answer of the defendant provides the opinions 
of the then attorney general of 1T tah and gives the 
same as the reason for non-payment of the fines here 
involved to the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff agrees that opinions of the attorney 
general should be g-iYen some consideration by this 
court. They, however, are by no means binding on the 
court. The weight giv·en an opinion of the attorney 
general should depend upon the soundness of the rea-
soning, the authorities relied upon, and the circum-
stances. 
The opinion dated December 21, 1938, a copy of 
which is part of defendant's answer herein, was given 
in response to .'-1. request by the state auditor, in which 
request the auditor sets forth the answer he wanted. 
Said opinion answered the question in the manner de-
sired. To point up the fallacy of that opinion, the last 
paragraph reads, ''In my opinion it does not make any 
difference who does the prosecuting if the action is 
one brought under the state law and is in the district 
court". The legislature, in Section 46-0-219, provided 
that the teSt on remitting fines should be who did the 
prosecuting. The attorney general says who did the 
prosecuting makes no difference to him, that it is the 
fact that the prosecution is under the state law and 
is in the district court that is controlling. This opinion 
is therefore right in the teeth of the legislative enact-
ment and should have no weight whatsoever. 
The opinion of April 4, 19·39, which opinion is also 
part of defendant's answer, makes the test the court 
in which the prosecution occured and expressly rules 
out test supplied by the legislature. 
11 
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The April 18, 1939, op1n1on which is part of 
defendant's answer maintains the test of "which court". 
The last paragraph of that opinion reads: 
"I do not belive it was the intention of the 
Legislature to allow towns, cities or counties to 
participate in the fines and forfeitures where 
the prosecution was had in the district courts of 
the State, since any appearing in the District 
Court on behalf of such prosecutions would be 
appearing on behalf of the district attorney, and 
the prosecution by the said town, city or county 
officer would not be that procecution as is meant 
by the provision that where violators of the Act 
are prosecuted to a conviction by the officer of 
any town, city or county, the State Treasurer 
·shall pay all amounts collected as fines, for-
feitures or costs as the result of such prose-
cution.'' 
Assume that any appearance by an officer of a 
city, town or county in the district court is "an appear-
ance on behalf of the district attorney" as the opinion 
says, what has that to do with the question of which 
unit gets the fines~ The purpose of the statute was 
to encourage local governmental units to assist in 
enforcing the Liquor Control Act and to give them 
the fines for successful prosecutions by their offi-
cers. Wben district court appearances are made by 
city, town or county officers, they remain officers of 
said local units, they are paid by said local units-not 
by the state. They are officers of the local unit 
whether acting in the city court or in the district court. 
To say they are state officers is not only erroneous 
in fact, but if it follows that their employer does not 
12 
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participate in the fine8 collected, the very purpose 
of 46-0-219 is defeated and the local units will not be 
encouraged to enforee those provisions of the Liquor 
Control Act whirh must be handled in the district 
courts. In the cases here concerned, regardless of the 
authority with which Ogden City officers were clothed 
to enable them to appear in the district court, they 
remained in fact officers of Ogden City; were paid by 
Ogden City and have no claim against the state for 
sa1aries. If said officers in prosecuting these cases 
were clothed with certain authority of district attorneys, 
i. e. represent the state in indictable misdemeanor cases 
in district court, what has that to do with the question 
here involved~ They remained officers of Ogden City, 
accountable to Ogden City, paid by Ogden City, and 
except for their being officers of Ogden City, they 
would not have taken any action in any of these cases. 
Even if the Attorney General were right in his 
opinion that "an appearance in the district court was 
an appearance on behalf of the district attorney'', it 
would not follow that the local unit employing the· 
officer so appearing should not receive the fruits of 
his efforts. The statute recognizes that the local ser-
vant is worthy of his hire, and as a matter of common 
justice, the unit that employed him to do state work 
should receive the benefits of that work. If city officers 
at the request of the legislature perform services for 
the state, the state should pay the city the promised 
consideration. 
Thus we see that the opinions of the Attorney 
General are contrary to the purpose and express word-
13 
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ing of the· statute. None of the opinions cite any author-
ities or precedents. It follows that said opinions are 
entitled to no weight whatever by this court. 
POINT 3. THERE HAS BEEN NO ACQUIES-
CENCE BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE INTERPRETATION. 
The defendant's interpretation of Section 46-0-219 
and his and his predecessor's action in accordance there-
with are not controlling in this case. In his memoran-
dum of authorities, the defendant cites part of Section 
319, Am. Jur. (50 Am. Jur. 309) on this question. Fur-
ther down in the same section, the editors say: 
''A contemporaneous construction is not, 
however controlling; it does not preclude an 
inquiry into the correctness of the construction. 
It is not of such high authority as a judicial inter-
pretation of an act. It bas even been declared 
that a contemporaneous or practical construc-
tion of a statute must be resorted to with cau-
tion and reserve. In any event, to apply the 
doctrine of contemporaneous or practical cons-
truction to a statute, the statute so 80nstrued 
must he doubtful, ambiguous, or uncertain, and 
the ambiguity which arises from the language 
must be so great as to compel the court to seize 
upon extraneous circumstances to aid in reach-
ing a conclusion. Where the meaning of a statute 
is plain, a contemporaneous or practical cons-
truction thereof will not be permitted to con-
trol, modify, destroy, abrogate, contradict, en-
large, or restrict that meaning.'' 
14 
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This court in two relatively recent cases considered 
administratiYe interpretations. In Olsen Company v. 
State Tar Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 P. (2d) 324, 
on Page 332 of the Pacific Report, the court saiid: 
''Where there is an ambiguity in the statute 
as to "·hether the latter does or does not cover 
a particular matter, a practical construction of 
the statute shown to have been the accepted 
construction of the agency charged with admin-
istering the matters in question under the sta-
tute will be one factor which the court may take 
into consideration as persuasive as to the mean-
ing of the statute. Especially is this true where 
the agency, as in this case, is one on whom the 
Legislature must rely to advise it as to the practi-
cal working out of the statute and where prac-
ti~l application of the statute presents1 the 
agency with unique opportunities and experiences 
for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or im-
provements in the statute. But such factor is 
only one among others peruasive on the court 
when it is engaged in the interpretation of the 
statute and may be given much or little weight 
in the total consideration of the question depend-
ing on circumstances but never against the plain 
meaning of the statute. . . . . '' 
In Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 
Utah 24, 151 P. (2d) 467, 153 A. L. R. 1176, headnotes 
of the Pacific Report (which are approved by the court 
under the constitutional requirement for syUabi) read: 
Headnote No. 5: ''Administrative agencies, in 
executing statutory scheme, must not only deter-
mine administrative questions involved, but apply 
law in first instance, that is, venture initial deci-
sion on judicial questions, but such a decision 
15 
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is neyer binding, for binding decision of law 
question affecting private rights may be made 
only by appropriate· court acting judicially.'' 
Headnote No. 7: "An administrative interpreta-
tion out of harmony with and contrary to express 
provisions of statutes interpreted cannot be given 
weight, as construction may not be substituted 
for legislation.'' 
As said on Page 472 of the Pacific Report, bottom 
of second column: 
''To hold otherwise would permit the admin-
istrative tribunal to, in effect, amend a statute 
by the adoption of erroneous interpretive regu-
lation. Construction is not legislation and should 
not be given that effect." 
As to the plaintiff's acqiescence, defendant does 
not allege that plaitiff acquiesced, but only that the 
cities and town acquiesced. Ogden City can't be bound 
by other cities. The five cases here involved are the 
first cases in which Ogden City has attempted to obtain 
remittance of fines assessed by a district court in a liquor 
case. As f.ar as counsel for the plaintiff have been able 
to learn, these are the first cases Ogden City officiers 
have prosecuted in the District Court under the Liquor 
Control Act, and so this is the first opportunity the 
city could have had to find out the so-called administra-
tive interpretation in such cases and its first opport-
unity to acquiese or object to such interpretation. 
Acquiescence presupposes opportunity to speak or act 
and the failure to speak or act. The plaintiff herein has 
never and does not now acquiese to the state treasurer's 
interpretation of the statute here concerned. 
16 
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~\ssuming a city can aeqniesce in such a matter as 
here concerned, the plaintiff has not done so. 
A further obserYation -- eYen if thPre were a long 
established, well known administratiYe interpretation 
in this matter, and eYen if Ogden City had acquiesced 
in the same, since the administratiYo ruling is contrary 
to the express wording of the statute, the administrative 
interpretation, together with acquiescense, could not 
overturn the express statute and defeat the intention 
of the leg-islature. If it were not so, administrative 
officers could legislate merely by having the persons 
concerned acquiesce in their administrative interpre-
tations. See Utah Hotel vs. Tax Commission, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the above discussed points, it must he con-
cluded that the defendant has a clear and present sta-
tutory duty to remit to the plaintiff all fines and for-
feitures received by him in the criminal prosecutions 
described in the plaintiff's complaint. The opinions 
of the attorney general and alleged acquiescence of the 
plaintiff do not justify the retention of the moneys by 
the defendant. The alternative extraordinary writ here-
tofore issued by the court in this matter should be made 
permanent. 
Plaintiff's Address: 
Municipal Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER 
CHARLES H. SNEDDON 
JACK A. RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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